GH₵74M-2022, GH₵2.15 Billion- 2023, GH₵4.84 Billion-2024
By Prince Ahenkorah
The numbers are in, and they’re damning. The much-hyped Gold-for-Oil (G4O) and Gold-for-Refinery (G4R) schemes once paraded as silver bullets for forex woes have hemorrhaged over GH₵7 billion in just three years.
Interestingly, the very architects of this fiscal sinkhole have rebranded themselves as economic prophets, now leading the charge against the very mess they engineered.
According to Bank of Ghana data released in response to a Right to Information request, the G4O/G4R programmes recorded losses of GH₵74 million in 2022, GH₵2.15 billion in 2023, and a staggering GH₵4.84 billion in 2024. The figures, drawn from final audited accounts, include losses from artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) gold, oil swaps, and refinery-linked transactions.
What began as a patriotic pivot swapping Ghana’s gold for oil to ease forex pressure has turned into a fiscal fiasco. In 2023, Ghana moved 37 tonnes of gold, valued at over $1.5 billion. By 2024, that figure ballooned to 56 tonnes, worth over $4 billion. Yet the net result was a deepening deficit: nearly GH₵6 billion in combined losses over two years.
while the losses were fast recording, BoG insisted the programme was a strategic play to stabilise the cedi and diversify reserves. But critics say the numbers expose a deeper dysfunction poor pricing, opaque procurement, and a gold trade riddled with inefficiencies.
What’s more galling is the sudden emergence of former Akufo-Addo administration officials who presided over the programme’s design and execution as self-styled economic messiahs. With the ink barely dry on the losses, these same actors have launched a coordinated smear campaign against the current government, peddling half-truths and revisionist spin in a bid to rewrite history.
From social media broadsides to partisan press briefings, the narrative is clear: deflect blame, demand equalisation, and drown the facts in noise. One former finance minister even claimed the losses were “normal” and accused the current administration of “PR gimmicks” conveniently ignoring the fact that the rot began under his watch.
Insiders say the G4O/G4R programmes were riddled with structural flaws from inception flaws that were ignored in the rush to score political points. The reliance on ASM gold, often sourced under murky conditions, only compounded the risks. Yet when the bills came due, the same officials who greenlit the schemes vanished only to resurface now as critics-in-chief.
The central bank has yet to release 2025 figures, pending audit. But with over 100 tonnes of ASM gold already recorded, the final tally could push losses even higher.
As Ghana grapples with the fallout, the question is no longer whether the G4O/G4R experiment failed it’s who will take responsibility. For now, the architects of the crisis are busy laundering their legacies, hoping the public forgets who lit the match.
But the numbers don’t lie. And neither should those who once called the shots.
