By Patience Aidam Frimpong
Imagine an Accra-based company preparing to pay a Chinese supplier for a shipment of equipment. The companies have worked together before, and the invoice is expected. Then an email appearing to come from the supplier says its bank details have changed. The accounts team updates the payment instructions and sends the money.
Later, someone calls the supplier to confirm when the equipment will be shipped. The supplier says it has not received payment and never asked the company to use a new account.
The company’s first question is: Can the money be found?
In this hypothetical case, the payment has already moved out of the receiving account. The company knows where it sent the funds, but that is only the first stop. Following the money could reveal other accounts used to move it, show whether similar payments were diverted and give investigators leads to pursue. The challenge is to assemble that picture before the trail becomes harder to follow.
The payment is gone, but it has left a trail
A transfer does not disappear without a record. The sending bank can identify when the company made the payment and the account details it used. The receiving institution may see when the money arrived and whether it was transferred onward. If it passes through other accounts or payment services, each may hold another part of the journey.
Those records do not automatically explain what happened. The company’s bank may have seen a payment to a supplier account, with no way to know from the transfer alone that the email was false. The receiving institution may see money arrive and leave, without knowing why the company sent it. No single institution necessarily sees the entire route.
Tracing the payment therefore means connecting records held in different places and understanding what they show. What might prompt an institution to look more closely at a transfer that first appeared legitimate?
What makes a transaction suspicious?
The company’s bank may see a payment to a new overseas account, but it may have no reason to know the supplier’s email was false. The receiving institution might notice something different: a large payment arrives in an account and is quickly transferred elsewhere. If that account has received similar payments from other companies, the pattern may warrant a closer look.
An automated system can flag unusual activity, but people must assess it in context. Does the account normally receive commercial payments? Is there a reasonable explanation for moving the funds so quickly? A rapid transfer may be suspicious without being criminal.
If concern remains, a useful report should set out the transactions, explain why they stand out and identify what is still unknown. Even then, the reporting institution sees only part of the picture. Its observation becomes more valuable when it can be assessed alongside information held elsewhere.
From a report to financial intelligence
If the receiving institution cannot explain the account activity, it may submit a suspicious transaction report: a record of the transactions, the surrounding facts and why they raise concern. The report is a lead, not a finding that the account holder has committed a crime.
A financial intelligence unit, or FIU, receives and analyses such reports. Its value lies in seeing beyond one institution’s records. It can compare reports and other information it is legally permitted to access, looking for connections that may not be visible to the bank that made the first report.
In the company’s case, the receiving bank might report the rapid movement of the payment. A payment provider might separately report unusual activity involving another account. If the accounts share a phone number, business identity or pattern of transfers, the FIU may be able to see a wider trail. Each institution held a piece; analysis gives those pieces meaning.
That is financial intelligence: information examined and connected to help authorities understand a possible financial crime and decide where to look. The connections could point investigators toward further records or people to question. They do not, however, establish that anyone committed an offence. Investigators must still test what the pattern means.
Intelligence points the way; evidence establishes the case
The FIU’s analysis may point investigators toward accounts, transactions and people worth examining. It cannot, by itself, establish that a crime occurred or identify who was responsible.
An account that receives payments from several companies and sends money onward might be part of a scam. It might also belong to a legitimate business paying its own suppliers. Investigators must test both possibilities: verify the account holder’s explanation, examine relevant records and establish who instructed and benefited from the transfers. Any case brought before a court must rest on evidence gathered and presented under the applicable law.
Financial records contain sensitive information. Authorities need lawful grounds to access and share it, with safeguards against misuse and respect for due process. These protections help ensure that a suspicious pattern is investigated fairly rather than treated as a verdict.
Careful investigation takes time. Yet when funds continue to move, even a strong lead can lose value if it reaches investigators too late.
Where the trail breaks
In the hypothetical company’s case, the payment moves through accounts and payment services in two countries. A request for the next set of records may take longer than the transfer itself. By the time investigators see where the money went, it may have moved again.
The trail can also weaken before an investigation begins. A late report loses precious time. A vague one may say that activity is “unusual” without showing which transfers are connected or why they matter. Meanwhile, a bank, mobile-money provider and fintech firm may each hold a different piece of the story.
Cross-border tracing adds another challenge: rules for obtaining and sharing information, as well as the speed of responses, differ by jurisdiction. The extent of these challenges varies across African countries and institutions. But the practical lesson is clear. Following fast-moving money requires useful information to reach the right people through dependable channels while it can still guide action.
What would make the trail easier to follow?
The first improvement is a better report, sent promptly. “Unusual transfers” tells an analyst little. A useful report sets out the account’s history, the sequence of payments, any linked details such as phone numbers or business names, and the reason the activity stands out. It also makes clear what the institution knows and what it cannot verify.
Financial institutions and payment providers need staff who can examine alerts in context and explain their concerns clearly. FIUs can then compare reports, identify patterns across institutions and give reporting entities feedback that helps improve future submissions. A report becomes more valuable when it helps someone take the next investigative step.
Investigators need clear, lawful procedures for requesting records and following up on leads. Regulators can help set expectations for reporting quality and secure cooperation. Where funds cross borders, authorised counterparts need dependable channels for sharing relevant information.
For the Accra company, none of these steps guarantees recovery of its payment. Together, they improve the chance that the trail can be followed while it is still useful and that any action rests on information that has been properly examined.
Conclusion: Making the Trail Count
Can the Accra company’s money be found? There is no guaranteed answer. A trail of transactions may show where the payment went, but tracing funds does not automatically mean recovering them or proving who committed the fraud.
What financial intelligence offers is a better chance to act on what the records reveal. A detailed report can expose a pattern that a bare alert would miss. Analysis can connect information held by different institutions. Investigators can then test those connections, seek evidence and decide what action the law permits. Each step depends on the quality of the information and how quickly it reaches the people who need it.
The company’s case is hypothetical, but the lesson extends beyond one diverted payment. Financial intelligence matters when it turns scattered records into leads that can be examined fairly and acted on in time. Money moves quickly. The intelligence needed to follow it must move with purpose.
About Author:
Patience Aidam Frimpong is a Financial Crime, Compliance & Regulatory Affairs Professional
She has experience in the banking sector and a growing specialisation in anti-money laundering, fraud risk management, regulatory compliance and financial markets regulation.