MIIF In $2.3 Billion Hangover

A Story of How Ghana’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Became a Patronage Piggy Bank and Is Now Fighting to Survive

TNR Files

When Ghana’s Minerals Income Investment Fund (MIIF) announced a GH¢1.1 billion profit for 2025, the finance ministry called it a “resilient turnaround.” But a six‑month examination of the Fund’s internal records, audit reports, and court filings reveals a far less triumphant story: MIIF is still carrying the wreckage of nearly GH¢2.3 billion in investments made under the previous Akufo‑Addo administration many of them steered toward party financiers, some of them enforced by armed security operatives, and nearly all of them now underperforming or unrecoverable.
The profit, in other words, is not a sign of growth. It is a survival exercise, achieved only after the government slashed the Fund’s royalty share from 77.6% to 2% — forcing management to cut costs to the bone while the bad bets remain on the books, slowly bleeding value.
The single largest hole in MIIF’s balance sheet is the Gold Trade Programme, a flagship initiative of the Akufo‑Addo era. The Fund poured capital into a network of aggregators meant to buy and market small‑scale gold. But when the programme was terminated in April 2025 replaced by the state‑owned GoldBod nearly GH¢1.7 billion remained outstanding from those aggregators.
Documents obtained by this newspaper show that MIIF’s current management has vowed to recover the funds, but internal memos describe the prospects as “not cheerful.” The aggregators are largely opaque entities, many with no clear asset base. Legal action is underway, but sources close to the Fund say the recovery process could take years and may yield only a fraction of the total.

The Ada Songor Deal: A Case Study in Political Capture
Perhaps the most troubling legacy investment is the GH¢360 million preference share stake in Electrochem Ghana Limited a company controlled by MacDan, a well‑known financier of the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The project, situated in the Ada Songor salt flats, was awarded under the Akufo‑Addo government amid fierce local opposition.
Court records and witness testimonies from the time describe a coordinated campaign of intimidation. According to multiple accounts, private security operatives hired by Electrochem described by residents as “bloodhounds” forcibly dispersed protesters and occupied communal lands. The government never publicly condemned the actions.
MIIF’s accounts show paper gains of GH¢158 million from this investment, but those are unrealised. Electrochem has been dormant for ten months as of early 2025, and its financial condition is described as “precarious.” No dividends have been paid. The GH¢360 million remains locked in a non‑performing asset.

Asante Gold and Atlantic Lithium: Paper Losses, Real Risks
The Fund also holds equity stakes in two mining companies that are now deep underwater.
· Asante Gold Corporation: MIIF purchased shares for GH¢361.85 million. By mid‑2026, the market value had fallen to GH¢209.28 million a potential loss of GH¢152.57 million, or 42% of the initial outlay.
· Atlantic Lithium Limited: The Fund invested GH¢62.27 million. By June, nearly a third GH¢17.74 million had been eroded. Worse, a pending acquisition by a Chinese producer would trigger a further 16% realised loss, forfeiting an additional GH¢13.1 million.
In total, the Fund is carrying at least GH¢1.8 billion in potentially impaired or unrecoverable assets more than its entire annual profit for 2025.
So how did MIIF post a GH¢1.1 billion profit while drowning in bad debts? The answer lies in the 2025 amendment to the MIIF Act (Act 1137), which reduced the Fund’s share of mineral royalties from 77.6% to 2% and cut its dividend entitlements from state‑held mining interests.
In effect, the government starved MIIF of new revenue and forced it to shrink. The profit is a product of slashing liabilities current liabilities fell 37%, trade payables dropped 91% and hoarding cash. Retained earnings grew 35% not because of investment returns, but because management stopped spending. The equity‑to‑assets ratio improved from 27% to 43% a classic sign of a shrinking institution, not a growing one.
Yet the Fund’s management deserves some credit. Total mineral royalty collections actually increased from GH¢4.9 billion to GH¢5.4 billion in 2025, even as MIIF’s share collapsed. That suggests the inter‑agency collections framework put in place in 2023 is working. But that is operational discipline, not portfolio performance.

What the Public Still Doesn’t Know
The government has not published a full forensic review of the Akufo‑Addo legacy investments. It has not disclosed the terms of the Electrochem deal, nor the legal basis for the Ada Songor award. It has not explained why the Gold Trade aggregators were allowed to walk away with GH¢1.7 billion.
And the public has not been told how much of that money if any will ever be recovered.
This newspaper asked MIIF for detailed breakdowns of each investment and a timeline for recovery. A spokesperson said they would “provide more information in due course” but declined to specify when.

The Bigger Picture
MIIF’s 2025 results are a testament to financial discipline in a hostile environment. But they are also a warning. A sovereign wealth fund that must cut costs to survive, while holding billions in non‑performing assets, is not a fund that is thriving it is a fund that is treading water.
The real test will come when the Fund is forced to mark those assets to market. When Asante Gold’s GH¢152 million loss is realised, when Electrochem’s GH¢360 million is written off, when the GH¢1.7 billion Gold Trade debt is acknowledged as unrecoverable then the true cost of political patronage will be laid bare for all Ghanaians to see.
Until then, the GH¢1.1 billion profit is less a victory lap than a stay of execution.
This investigation was based on MIIF’s audited financial statements for 2024 and 2025, the Minerals Income Investment Fund (Amendment) Act, 2025 (Act 1137), court documents from the Ada Songor case, internal MIIF memos obtained by this newspaper, and interviews with current and former Fund officials, all of whom spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorised to discuss internal deliberations.